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Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Eric A. Posner* and Cass R. Sunstein** 
Abstract 
The regulatory state has become a cost-benefit state, in the sense that under prevailing executive 
orders, agencies must catalogue the costs and benefits of regulations before issuing them, and in 
general, must show that their benefits justify their costs. Agencies have well-established tools for 
valuing risks to health, safety, and the environment. Sometimes, however, regulations are 
designed to protect moral values, and agencies struggle to quantify those values; on important 
occasions, they ignore them. That is a mistake. People may care deeply about such values, and 
they suffer a welfare loss when moral values are compromised. If so, the best way to measure 
that loss is through eliciting private willingness to pay. Of course it is true that some moral 
commitments cannot be counted in cost-benefit analysis, because the law rules them off-limits. It 
is also true that the principal reason to protect moral values is not to prevent welfare losses to 
those who care about them. But from the welfarist standpoint, those losses matter, and they 
might turn out to be very large. Agencies should take them into account. If they fail to do so, they 
might well be acting arbitrarily and hence in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
These claims bear on a wide variety of issues, including protection of foreigners, of children, of 
rape victims, of future generations, and of animals. 
I. The Thesis 
Consider the following cases: 
1. Congress has directed the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue a regulation
to ensure disclosure of “conflict minerals” – minerals used to finance mass atrocities.1
The SEC is required to catalogue the costs and benefits of its regulation (to the extent
feasible). It is aware that many consumers are interested in the relevant information.
How, if at all, should the SEC monetize that interest?
2. The Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act2 provides labelling standards for
tuna products. It includes standards by which companies may label their products
“dolphin safe.”3 Many consumers care a great deal about the protection of dolphins
and want to see those labels. How, if at all, should the Department of Agriculture
incorporate that concern in issuing standards? Should it attempt to monetize it?
* Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School
** Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. The authors are grateful to the Russell Baker Scholars 
Fund and to the Harvard Law School Program on Behavioral Economics and Public Policy for support. 
1 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed.Reg. 56,274, 56,277–78 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b). 
2 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012). 
3 Id. 
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3. Many consumers are concerned about genetically modified (GM) food.4 While some 
of them are concerned about health and the environment, others believe that genetic 
modification of food is “just wrong.” Congress has required the Department of 
Agriculture to label GM food as such.5 How, if at all, should the Department take 
account of consumer sentiment in cataloging the rule’s benefits? 
 
In some important contexts, governments regulate products because some or many people 
believe that their production is immoral, or at least morally problematic. The regulation might 
involve protection of children, of people in other nations, of victims of some kind of 
wrongdoing, of animals, or even of nature.6 In most cases, their production involves concrete 
harms, such as lives lost, which are what trigger the moral concern. The goal of regulation – 
whether it is a mandate, a ban, or a labelling requirement – is to reduce those harms. In some 
cases, it is difficult or perhaps impossible to identify concrete harms, but people nonetheless 
favor regulation as a way of expressing and realizing their moral commitments (as in the context 
of genetically modified food). Yet regulators are normally required to perform cost-benefit 
analysis whenever they issue a major regulation, and cost-benefit analysis requires the regulator 
to identify and monetize all harms and benefits. Our principal question here is how regulators 
should take account of moral commitments in undertaking cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Our simple answer, put too briefly, is that they should ask: How much are people willing 
to pay to honor those commitments? We acknowledge that this answer is jarring, because the 
question of what morality requires is usually not answered by asking how much people are 
willing to pay to promote it. Nonetheless, we urge that from a welfarist perspective, that is an 
important question. Suppose that a consumer, John, cares about an assortment of things, 
including his longevity, his health, his comfort, and dolphins. Suppose that a substantial 
component of his welfare is the welfare of dolphins. If they suffer, he suffers. But how much 
does he suffer? Here as elsewhere, and whatever its limitations,7 his willingness to pay is the best 
available measure. 
 
An alternative view is that even though they matter, moral commitments should not be 
taken to be part of a cost-benefit analysis; they raise entirely independent issues and must be 
engaged seriously but separately. On that view, analysis of costs and benefits is important but not 
exhaustive; it turns on a narrower set of factors, such as effects on income and health.8 We agree 
that moral commitments often signal values that are not adequately captured by private 
willingness to pay. If the goal is to prevent mass atrocities in a foreign country, Americans’ 
willingness to pay to prevent mass atrocities hardly exhausts the welfare effects of preventing 
mass atrocities. But in response, we emphasized that people’s welfare may well be affected and 
even profoundly affected by broader considerations, as demonstrated by willingness to pay. If 
people lose welfare because of the suffering or death of others – people in other countries, their 
                                                      
4 Sydney E. Scott et al., Evidence for Absolute Moral Opposition to Genetically Modified Food in the United States, 
11 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 316 (2016).  
5 National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216 (2016) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq. 
(2016)).  
6 See Denis Swords, Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior: A Contingent Step Forward for 
Environmentalists, 51 LA. L. REV. 1347 (1991). 
7 For one discussion, see PETER DORMAN, MARKETS AND MORTALITY (1996) 
8 That is the focus of standard discussions. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY (1998). 
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own children, rape victims, dolphins, members of future generations – their loss ought to be 
counted.  
 
To be sure, the welfare loss might be hard to measure,9 and in many cases, it might turn 
out to be relatively or even trivially small, not least because people’s budget constraints might 
mean that they are unwilling to spend a great deal to vindicate any particular moral commitment. 
But in principle, there is no justification for refusing to include, in a cost-benefit analysis, 
people’s willingness to pay to protect such commitments. If an agency ignores the resulting 
number, and thus treats people’s moral concerns as valueless, there is a strong argument that it is 
acting arbitrarily and therefore in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.10 The resulting 
regulation will be too weak. 
 
The issue is hardly fanciful. In recent years, the Environmental Protection Agency has 
issue regulations designed largely to protect fish from discharges from power plants.11 On 
standard assumptions, the direct benefits of such protection in terms of human welfare—perhaps 
in the form of ecological benefits and improved recreation—are relatively small and far less than 
the costs.12 But it has been vigorously urged that apart from those standard benefits, people 
would be willing to pay something more to provide such protection, because they care about 
protecting fish—and that once that figure is aggregated across the population and included in the 
benefits figure, aggressive regulation is amply justified.13 And indeed, a court of appeals struck 
down a damage measure, from the Department of Interior, that refused to consider people’s 
willingness to pay to protect the continued existence of pristine areas and the animals that live 
there.14 In the court’s view, it was unlawful for the agency to focus entirely on use value and to 
ignore private willingness to pay, which would depend, in that case, on moral considerations.15 
That conclusion has potentially broad implications, suggesting that in certain contexts, a refusal 
to use contingent valuation methods to account for “existence value”16—reflecting the value of 
the continued existence of a wilderness beyond its utility for recreation and food—would be 
arbitrary and therefore unlawful. 
 
                                                      
9 On some of the challenges and potential solutions in an especially difficult context, see Sean Hannon Williams, 
Statistical Children, 30 YALE J. REG. 63 (2013). 
10 See Ohio v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (DC Cir 1989). 
11 Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Announces National Limits to Reduce Toxic Pollutants Discharged into 
Waterways by Steam Electric Power Plants (2015), available at https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-
national-limits-reduce-toxic-pollutants-discharged-waterways-steam; see also Steam Electric Power Generating 
Effluent Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 67837 (Nov. 3, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423). 
12 The EPA so concluded in issuing the regulation at issue in Entergy Corp v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 
(2009). 
13 Frank Ackerman & Elizabeth A. Stanton, Comments on Regulation of Cooling Water Intake Structures at 
Existing Facilities (Aug. 8, 2011), available at 
http://frankackerman.com/publications/costbenefit/Regulation_Cooling_Water.pdf.  
14 Ohio, 880 F.2d at 462–64.  
15 See id. 
16 See John Quiggin, Existence Value and the Contingent Valuation Method, 37 AUSTRALIAN ECON. PAPERS 312 





We do not mean to take a stand on the controversy over contingent valuation methods 
here,17 and our claim is emphatically not meant to suggest that willingness to pay captures all of 
the welfare benefits of regulations that are designed to protect third parties. The ultimate goal of 
the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act is to protect dolphins, not John. But insofar as 
John’s welfare is increased by the protection of dolphins, his willingness to pay is part of the 
cost-benefit analysis. Though valuation of third parties is not our principal topic here, and 
presents independent challenges, we shall have something to say about it in due course.  
 
We have acknowledged that our suggestion is jarring, but in prominent cases, 
government regulators have essentially accepted it. In a regulation involving building access for 
people who use wheelchairs, regulators emphasized that if the average (nondisabled) American 
was willing to pay a very small amount to increase such access, the regulation would have 
benefits in excess of costs.18 On the regulators’ view, that willingness to pay was relevant to the 
assessment of whether the regulation was justified. In a regulation designed to reduce the 
incidence of prison rape, regulators enlisted a contingent valuation study suggesting that 
(unimprisoned) Americans would pay over $300,000 to eliminate a case of prison rape, and 
added that in light of that number, the regulation likely had benefits in excess of costs.19 In a case 
involving protection of children from backover crashes, the Department of Transportation 
pointed to, without monetizing, parents’ desire to provide that protection.20 And in response to 
the court of appeals decision noted above, the Department of Interior acknowledged the 
importance of considering existence value in assessing natural resource damages.21  
 
To be sure, these are unusual regulations, for which calculation of benefits was especially 
challenging, thus creating an incentive for creativity. But if our analysis is correct, regulators 
were on the right track in all four cases — and their approach has far more general implications 
for valuation of regulatory benefits. 
 
 
                                                      
17 For skeptical views, see Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: From Dubious to Hopeless, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 
(2012); Daniel Kahmeman & Jack Knetsch, Valuing Public Goods, 22 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 57 (1992). 
18 “The second threshold estimate, by contrast, calculates the average monetary value each American (on a per 
capita basis) would need to place annually (over a fifteen year period) on the ‘existence’ of improved accessibility 
for persons with disabilities (or the ‘insurance’ of improved accessibility for their own potential use in the future) in 
order for the NPVs for each respective requirement to equal zero. Under this methodology, if Americans on average 
placed an ‘existence’ value and/or ‘insurance’ value of between 2 cents on the low end to 7 cents on the high end per 
requirement, then the NPVs for each of these requirements would be zero. Note that this latter calculation assumes 
no added value of avoided humiliation, of increased safety and increased independence.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE: 
DISABILITY RIGHTS SEC. OF THE CIV. RIGHTS DIVISION, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL 
REVISED REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING TITLES II AND III OF THE ADA, INCLUDING REVISED ADA STANDARDS FOR 
ACCESSIBLE DESIGN 142–46 (2010), available at 
https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/RIA_2010regs/DOJ%20ADA%20Final%20RIA.pdf 
19 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT 
FINAL RULE (May 17, 2012), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_ria.pdf. 
20 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Rearview Mirrors; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Low-Speed 
Vehicles Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,186, 76,238 (Dec. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 
pts. 571, 585).  
21 Natural Resource Damages for Hazardous Substances, 73 Fed. Reg. 11,081, 11,083–84 (Feb. 29, 2008) (to be 
codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11). For a defense of approach and general discussion, see David A. Dana, Existence Value 
and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 343 (2004). 
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The question of how to address people’s moral commitments in cost-benefit analysis is of 
great importance, and not only because many regulations advance moral goals. The problem for 
agencies is that when Congress commands them to advance such goals, it rarely provides 
guidance about the level of costs that should be imposed on the private sector in the course of 
achieving those goals. The SEC calculated that its conflict minerals regulation would cost 
industry about $5 billion, and in light of the statutory mandate, it deemed that amount a 
reasonable price to pay in order to enhance disclosure of conflict minerals use.22 But what if a 
slightly more effective regulation would have cost $50 billion or $500 billion? Should the SEC 
have imposed huge costs on the private sector in order to improve disclosure by only a small 
amount? Critics of cost-benefit analysis, who claim that moral gains are not monetizable and 
therefore that agencies should not use cost-benefit analysis at all,23 have not given a satisfactory 
answer to this question. We argue that if agencies monetize the moral benefits of regulations, 
they will be in a better position to decide on the stringency of regulations in a non-arbitrary way. 
In some cases, monetization of moral benefits will justify stronger regulations. 
 
We emphasize that our argument, concrete though it is, touches directly on some of the 
most abstract and fundamental issues in legal and political theory24 -- and that it is important to 
identify limiting principles. Some moral commitments, such as belief in racial segregation or 
suppression of sexually explicit speech, are inconsistent with the Constitution or with statutes 
authorizing regulatory action; it is legitimate for regulators to conclude that those commitments 
cannot be counted in the analysis. As a limitation on the reach of our argument, some people 
might also insist on ideas, associated with the liberal political tradition, that forbid interference 
with purely self-regarding behavior by reference to the moral concerns of outsiders.25 For 
example, people might be willing to pay something to stop same-sex marriages, use of 
contraceptives, sales of alcohol, and indoor tanning. Welfarists may or may not be willing to take 
account of third-party preferences of this kind,26 but it is possible to embrace the thrust of our 
argument while also insisting on such a limitation on its domain. Some moral commitments 
operate at an exceedingly high level of generality, as when people suffer or rejoice as a result of 
the very fact of regulation. On strict welfarist principles, such commitments should be counted, 
but it seems safe to say that regulators ought to ignore them, on the ground that the analysis 
becomes too unruly, and too untethered, if they are taken into account. In due course, we shall 
explore all of these arguments. 
 
The remainder of this essay is as follows. In Part II, we begin by reviewing the moral 
foundations of cost-benefit analysis. That form of analysis is best understood as a decision-
procedure for advancing welfare; it does not directly advance non-welfarist goals. But we also 
show that to the extent that society’s failure to vindicate non-welfarist moral commitments also 
affects the well-being of the public, cost-benefit analysis can and should capture that effect, at 
least in principle. In Part III, we apply our method to a heterogeneous array of real-world areas 
of regulation that bear on important moral values: conflict minerals; GMOs; mortality risk faced 
                                                      
22 See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed.Reg. 56,274, 56,277–78 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b). 
23 See, e.g., LISA HEINZERLING & FRANK ACKERMAN, PRICELESS (1996). 
24 For relevant perspectives, see JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859); Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a 
Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970). 
25 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1985).  
26 See Sen, supra note. 
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by children; prison rape; access for disabled people; and climate change. Part IV explores legal 





A. Welfarism and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Cost-benefit analysis is a decision-procedure used by regulatory agencies to evaluate 
regulations.27 Congress often gives agencies discretion whether to promulgate regulations in 
order to promote statutory goals, and even when Congress eliminates such discretion, agencies 
often have discretion with respect to levels of stringency.  
 
To provide two of countless examples, the EPA is authorized to issue regulations that are 
“appropriate and necessary”28 or that eliminate “unreasonable risk.”29 It is possible to read these 
apparently open-ended standards, at least in the abstract, as giving the EPA the freedom to 
choose regulations that are almost as strict or weak as it prefers.30 Beginning in the Reagan 
administration, the White House has required the EPA and other executive agencies to catalogue 
costs and benefits, and to demonstrate that regulatory benefits outweigh regulatory costs, in order 
to ensure that the regulations are justified.31 Reagan’s defining executive order makes cost-
benefit analysis the rule of decision “to the extent permitted by law.”32 That idea has been 
accepted and renewed, with variations not relevant here, by every president through Trump.33  
 
In important cases, federal courts have also held that prominent statutes, including those 
that set out both of the two foregoing standards, require that regulations are justified by a form of 
cost-benefit analysis.34 Indeed, all nine members of the Supreme Court have concluded that in 
the face of statutory ambiguity, agencies must consider costs as well as benefits, and thus engage 
in at least some kind of cost-benefit balancing.35 If an agency fails to consider costs, or if the 
benefits cannot be seen to justify the costs, its decision might well be invalidated as arbitrary.36 
                                                      
27 See MATTHEW ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); VISCUSI, 
supra note; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE (2014). On some of the theoretical complexities, see MATTHEW 
ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION (2011).  
28 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).  
29 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012). 
30For a conclusion to this effect in a related context, see American Trucking Ass’n, v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir. 
1999). 
31 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982). 
32 Id.  
33 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012); Exec. Order 
No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012). 
34 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015), and in particular: “The agency must consider cost — including, 
most importantly, cost of compliance — before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary. 
Reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the advantages and the disadvantages of agency 
decisions.” Id. at 2711. 
35 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2711, and these words from the dissent: “Cost is almost always a relevant—
and usually, a highly important—factor in regulation. Unless Congress provides otherwise, an agency acts 
unreasonably in establishing ‘a standard-setting process that ignore[s] economic considerations.’’ Id. at 2714 
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 




What accounts for the bipartisan (though admittedly not universal37) appeal of cost-
benefit analysis? The simplest answer is that human consequences matter, and cost-benefit 
analysis is a way of cataloguing them.38 Put less simply, the idea is that as a presumption, 
congressional grants of regulatory authority should be taken as an effort to increase people’s 
welfare or well-being. (We use the terms interchangeably.) While different agencies are given 
different missions, which allow them to develop and exploit their expertise, they should be taken 
to share this abstract commitment to human welfare.39  
 
A regulation typically has both positive and negative effects on welfare. It might save 
costs and improve health, safety, or some other component of well-being, but also create welfare 
losses, perhaps to health, safety, or some other component of well-being as well.40 For example, 
a regulation that increases fuel economy, and thus improves health by reducing air pollution, 
may produce less safe cars.41 A regulation that protects the ozone layer, by forbidding use of 
ozone-depleting chemicals, may require a ban on the use of cheap and effective asthma 
inhalers.42 A regulation that requires factories to install scrubbers in smokestacks benefits people 
by reducing the level of pollution in the air, but also creates costs for the factory owners, who 
must pay for the installation of the scrubbers.43 These costs are, in turn, likely to be passed along 
to workers, in the form of lower wages; to consumers, in the form of higher prices; and to 
shareholders, in the form of lower returns. All of these people lose income that they could 
otherwise use to buy things of importance to them. Since the ultimate goal of regulation is to 
advance well-being, these negative effects should be considered along with the positive effects. 
 
Even without using cost-benefit analysis, regulators have long been aware that they must 
engage in some sort of balancing. For example, an environmental regulation of maximal 
stringency could require the shutdown of factories and cause massive unemployment, which no 
one wants, and which can cause adverse health effects. For the years before the Reagan 
executive order, many agencies seem to have engaged in a kind of intuitive balancing, in which 
they chose regulations that produced benefits but were not unduly disruptive to important social 
interests.44 It was not always clear how they engaged in this balancing. A signal virtue of cost-
benefit analysis is that intuitive guesswork is replaced with a more rigorous style of reasoning, 
                                                      
37 See HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, supra note; David M. Driesen, Douglas A. Kysar & Amy Sinden, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48 (2009). 
38 For a valuable discussion of this claim, see HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK (1996). 
39 With this claim, we do not mean to disregard the suggestion that regulatory statutes are frequently enacted with 
the goal of helping well-organized private groups. For classic discussions, see GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND 
THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION (1975). Cost-benefit analysis can be seen as an effort to impose a welfarist 
check on this possibility, requiring congressional clarity. For a philosophical discussion of the meaning of welfare or 
well-being, see JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING (1986). 
40 See JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN WIENER, RISK VS. RISK (1997). 
41 Mark R. Jacobsen, Fuel Economy, Car Class Mix, and Safety, 101 AMER. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCS. 105, 
105–109 (2010).  
42 Users of Last CFC Inhalers Must Soon Switch, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm353701.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
43 For a classic discussion, see BRUCE ACKERMAN AND WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981). 
44 We simplify. For details, see W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS (1992). 
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one that, whatever its flaws, provides for far greater transparency about crucial variables and that 
should reduce the scope for error, at least if it is working well.45 
 
B. The Occasionally Acute Challenge of Monetization 
 
The key requirement of cost-benefit analysis is that the positive and negative effects of 
the regulation must be translated into the common metric of money (to the extent feasible). In the 
case of some benefits and some costs, the exercise is straightforward, because no translation is 
necessary. When a factory is required to install scrubbers, the cost is simply the amount of 
money needed to pay for the machinery and for the labor to install it. Because this cost is 
ultimately borne by consumers, workers, and shareholders, it reduces human welfare.46  
 
But monetizing some impacts (whether costs or benefits) can be far more complex.47 
Consider a regulation that enhances water quality in a national park by reducing industrial 
runoffs. Beneficiaries will include people who save the costs of traveling to a more distant 
national park or using private recreational facilities, such as an indoor waterpark. These costs can 
easily be put in monetary terms. But both costs and benefits may be nonpecuniary. Regulations 
can reduce mortality risk, minimize unpleasant but not dangerous health conditions like 
headaches, and enhance the beauty of the outdoors.  
 
Regulators sometimes describe such benefits as nonquantifiable.48 But they often attempt 
to convert them into monetary terms for use in cost-benefit analysis, and when they do so, they 
use a range of methods. Whatever the precise choice, they tend to begin by asking about people’s 
willingness to pay.49 In principle, they agree that the right question is how much people are 
willing to pay to eliminate (for example) a mortality risk of 1/100,000 or a morbidity risk of 
1/10,000. Typically, they derive estimates from market behavior—for example, calculating the 
value of reduced mortality risk by deriving risk premiums from labor market choices.50 More 
controversially, they sometimes use contingent valuation surveys, where people are simply asked 
to give monetary equivalents to nonpecuniary benefits.51  
 
Whatever the precise approach, the central idea is that if people face risks of one or 
another kind, or if they might obtain gains, the correct approach is to ask: How much is the 
relevant good actually worth to them? That approach has a natural fit with welfarism and in 
particular with that strand of the liberal political tradition, associated with John Stuart Mill, that 
relies on people’s own judgments about what serves their interests.52 But the willingness to pay 
                                                      
45 For a vivid argument to this effect, see DIETRICH DORNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE (1996). We acknowledge that 
there are alternative to cost-benefit analysis. For example, some people favor the precautionary principle. See 
DANIEL STEEL, PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2014). 
46 Even in this simple example, some costs may not be easy to monetize – as, for example, if the regulation produces 
unemployment.  
47 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1369 (2014). 
48 See id. at 1395. 
49 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE AGENCIES AND 
ESTABLISHMENTS: REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003).  
50 VISCUSI, supra note. 
51 Richard Carson, Contingent Valuation: A Practical Alternative When Prices Aren't Available, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 
27 (2012). 
52 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
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approach can also draw support from a competing strand of the same tradition, emphasizing 
autonomy rather than welfare.53 By asking how much people are willing to pay, regulators are 
respecting people’s right to trade off relevant goods as they see fit. To be sure, the willingness to 
pay criterion raises many questions and doubts,54 and we will have something to say about them 
here. For present purposes, the point is only that the use of that criterion is an intelligible way to 
ensure that regulators use people’s own valuations of multiple goods, including improved health 
and safety. 
 
C. Three Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Cost-benefit analysis has value only to the extent that it advances a normatively 
defensible goal. That goal, as we have explained, is human welfare. Cost-benefit analysis is not 
justified if it fails to advance welfare, and even if it does so, it might be criticized if it interferes 
with important non-welfarist goals (assuming, as many people believe, that there are some). 
Consider three limits of cost-benefit balancing. 
 
First, net benefits or net costs, as reflected in purely monetary measures based on 
willingness to pay, may greatly understate or overstate the actual effects of regulation on 
people’s lives.55 People might be willing to pay little for goods that would much improve their 
lives; they might be willing a pay a lot for goods that would not much improve their lives. The 
mounting interest in more direct measurement of subjective well-being56 has not yet produced an 
administrable way of capturing the actual effects of regulatory interventions.57 But it has pointed 
to the possibility that cost-benefit analysis may not capture those effects as accurately as other 
methods would. 
 
Second, some factors are especially difficult to translate into monetary equivalents, partly 
because of an absence of relevant information on the part of regulators, and partly because the 
challenge of monetization may be hard to surmount even if regulators are able to obtain that 
information.58 What, exactly, are the effects of a new security measure designed to reduce the 
risks of terrorism at airports? If we know those effects, how can they be monetized? What, 
exactly, are the benefits of increased capital and liquidity requirements, designed to reduce the 
risk of a financial crisis? Can those effects be turned into monetary equivalents? Even if we 
know how many lives will be saved by technology designed to reduce the risk of backover 
crashes, how can regulators monetize those savings, if the plurality of the lives saved consist of 
children under the age of four, and if what is being prevented is death at the hands of their own 
parents?59 
 
                                                      
53 See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 449 (2000). 
54 An obvious one is whether people’s willingness to pay reflects sufficient information or is subject to behavioral 
biases.  
55 John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1620 (2013). 
56 See, e.g., id.  
57 W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits of Mortality Risk Reduction: Happiness Surveys vs. the Value of a Statistical Life, 62 
DUKE L.J. 1735 (2013). 
58 See, e.g., John Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 894 (2015). 
59 For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2016). 
10 
 
A third challenge, and a source of intense debate, is the diminishing marginal utility of 
money. Because wealthy people value dollars less than poor people do, wealthy people are 
willing to pay more money for an outcome—say, clean air or the reduction of mortality risk—
that affects the welfare of rich and poor people the same. To say the least, it seems objectionable 
to say that the life of a wealthy person is worth more than the life of a poor person. In principle, 
however, that may not be a serious objection to the use of the willingness to pay criterion. Poor 
people do not spend as much on safety devices as rich people do; that is not because the lives of 
the poor are worth less but because the poor have less money and prefer to spend it on other 
things, like school supplies for their children. This is how a market economy works, and in the 
absence of special circumstances (such as an absence of information or a behavioral bias), 
regulators do poor people no favors by forcing them to use their resources on something for 
which they are unwilling to pay.  
 
It follows that if agencies issue regulations that reduce mortality risk by more than poor 
people are willing to pay, the regulations hurt rather than help poor people. People with little 
money should not be required to spend as much, to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000, as people with 
a great deal of money. But it is true that when a regulatory good is shared, assessment of welfare 
effects can be quite complicated.60 Regulators now use a single number to value mortality risks – 
about $9 million per statistical life61 – and hence disparities between rich and poor are not a 
matter of current practice. 
 
D. Willingness to Pay for Moral Reasons 
 
Many regulations are animated by moral concerns that go far beyond their effects on 
those who choose the relevant products. For example, a regulation might be designed to protect 
people who do not live in the United States. Indeed, the principal purpose of some regulations is 
to protect something other than human beings. Return to the Dolphin Protection Consumer 
Information Act, which imposed labelling requirements to inform consumers if tuna used in tuna 
products was caught using drift nets and other methods that harm dolphins.62 The statute 
evidently was passed in response to concerns that tuna harvesting caused excessive harm to 
dolphins, not to human well-being. 
 
To understand the category that concerns us here, compare Jane and Sam. Jane suffers 
from seafood intolerances, as a result of which she greatly benefits when food products include 
labels that disclose whether trace amounts of seafood are present in the product. Before the Food 
Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act63 was passed, she bought organic foods from 
specialty stores that cost about $1,000 per year more than comparable food products sold in 
                                                      
60 If a rich person’s WTP is used to determine a public good like air quality, then the effect is to redistribute wealth 
from the poor (in the form of higher prices) to the rich (in the form of air quality that is higher than what poor people 
desire). If the poor person’s WTP is used, then the effect is to redistribute wealth from the rich (who die at a higher 
rate than otherwise) to the poor (who pay lower prices). 
61 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REVISED DEPARTMENTAL GUIDANCE 2016: TREATMENT OF THE VALUE OF 
PREVENTING FATALITIES AND INJURIES IN PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES (2016), available at 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/2016%20Revised%20Value%20of%20a%20Statistical%20L
ife%20Guidance.pdf. 
62 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
63 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012). 
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supermarkets. As a result of the law, Jane can now shop at supermarkets; she is at least $1,000 
better off per year, and can use this money to buy goods and services that she could not afford in 
the past. As long as she uses this money for saving and consumption, the $1,000 amount is a 
reasonable approximation of the impact of the law on her well-being; it might well be a lower 
bound. 
 
Sam does not suffer from food intolerances, but he cares deeply about the well-being of 
dolphins. He donates $1,000 per year to a charity that lobbies for laws that protect dolphin 
populations from harm by drift nets used to catch tuna. When Congress enacts the Dolphin 
Protection Consumer Information Act, Sam is very happy. But he is not sure whether the law 
should affect his charitable giving. He still cares about dolphins, and thinks that the $1,000 might 
be used to lobby for a stricter law that bans drift nets, or for some other law that will help 
dolphins. But he also needs to pay his mortgage. 
 
The Allergen Labeling Act improves Jane’s well-being in a straightforward way. But 
does the Dolphin Act improve Sam’s well-being? A tempting position is that while the law helps 
advance one of Sam’s moral commitments, it does not affect his well-being. It does not improve 
his health or safety, give him goods or services to consume, or (directly) enhance his wealth (we 
will return to the issue of the charitable donation). Another way to make this point is to imagine 
a world in which people like Sam disappear. No one cares about dolphins anymore. Nonetheless, 
a respectable view in moral philosophy is that it remains wrong to kill dolphins unnecessarily 
with drift nets. A utilitarian will probably believe that the well-being of animals has independent 
moral importance.64 That was Bentham’s view, in fact,65 and we share it. But even philosophers 
who do not embrace utilitarianism often believe that an objective moral reality exists and does 
not depend on what people’s moral beliefs at any given moment.66 They believe, for example, 
that slavery is morally wrong even if no one in society, not even the slaves themselves, believe it 
is morally wrong.67 On this view, the moral worth of dolphins does not depend on whether Sam 
exists, or whether many or few people agree with Sam. 
 
This view seems to have a surprising implication. If, as we have argued, cost-benefit 
analysis is a welfarist decision-procedure, then there is an argument that insofar as regulators are 
engaging in that form of analysis, they will take into account Jane’s self-regarding preferences 
and disregard Sam’s moral beliefs. To understand this argument (which we shall shortly reject), 
consider the Benthamite view. If 100,000 dolphins exist, then their continued existence has 
moral value reflecting the well-being of those dolphins. If we take Sam’s $1,000 charitable 
donation as an approximation of his willingness-to-pay to keep the dolphins alive, this would 
imply that the moral value of the existence of the dolphins is $1,000. If 1,000 people agree with 
Sam, their moral value equals $1 million. And if the Sams disappeared, the moral value of 
dolphins in a cost-benefit analysis would fall to $0. But as we have explained, the moral value of 
the dolphins is not a function of the number of people who care about dolphins. This means that 
                                                      
64 See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975). 
65 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789). 
66 Alexander Miller, Realism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/realism/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
67 Cf. JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983) (discussing “adaptive preferences” and their challenge for utilitarianism). 
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the cost-benefit analysis should not treat Sam’s willingness-to-pay as a reflection of their moral 
value. 
 
On this view, a regulatory agency charged with implementing the Dolphin Act should 
conduct cost-benefit analyses, but insofar as it is doing so, it should ignore moral valuations, 
including those that are expressed in charitable donations. To be sure, moral arguments, captured 
in the commitment to the well-being of dolphins, matter and deserve independent consideration; 
under the relevant law, they might complement or override cost-benefit analysis. With respect to 
that form of analysis, however, Sam’s moral views are irrelevant.  
 
Our principal submission here is that this conclusion is not correct. The first and more 
minor point is that when Sam donates $1,000 to the dolphin charity, he has $1,000 less to spend 
on his own well-being. If we want to be precise, we need to analyze carefully Sam’s motivations. 
If the regulation causes Sam to spend the entire amount on himself, then the regulation does 
make him better off by $1,000. If a regulation that helps dolphins causes Sam to reconsider his 
moral priorities, and donate the money elsewhere, then it is harder to know whether and to what 
extent it improves Sam’s well-being.  
 
But there is a far more fundamental point, which bears directly on that question. Suppose 
that Sam’s subjective welfare is affected by what happens to dolphins. When he hears about 
them being caught in drift nets, he experiences a loss of welfare, probably captured in a pang of 
unhappiness. This sense of empathy is a psychological reaction, in some ways akin to disgust, 
anger, and fear, and it is highly relevant to Sam’s welfare. Certainly in principle, the cost-benefit 
analysis should take account of the positive psychological effect on people of protecting those 
about whom they care. People are willing to pay to improve their welfare, and affective states are 
an important component of welfare.  
 
It follows that if the entire dolphin population were eliminated, or if a significant 
numbers of dolphins were killed, then there would be two separate effects: a moral effect and a 
welfare effect. (To be sure, the moral effect is a kind of welfare effect, but it does not involve 
consumers or even human beings.) Both effects should count. If you are a moral realist, a moral 
wrong has taken place, and it is independent of the welfare effects on humans. The elimination of 
dolphins also harms human welfare by causing unhappiness or other welfare loss among people 
who care about dolphins. This harm can be measured, at least in principle, and is, of course, a 
function of the size of the human population that cares about dolphins. 
 
Here, in short, is our central claim: When regulators conduct cost-benefit analysis, they 
should include valuations that reflect how much people are willing to pay to see their moral 
beliefs vindicated or to reduce the level of psychological harm they feel if those beliefs are not 
vindicated. Those valuations will not capture everything that matters, but they are an important 
point of a full accounting. 
 
E. Limiting Principles 
 
We intend our claim to be a concrete and relatively straightforward suggestion for how to 
conduct cost-benefit analysis. But we acknowledge that our argument turns out to bear on some 
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of the most fundamental questions in legal and political theory, and taken for all that it is worth, 
it might seem unacceptably broad. To see the concern, suppose that people think that 
pornography is morally unacceptable and are willing to pay something to ban it; some people 
have strong moral objections to the use of contraceptives, and they would pay to see them 
banned; that the very idea of alcohol consumption is, to many people, morally problematic, and 
they would gladly pay to reduce it; that certain religious practices seem morally offensive to 
people who would be willing to pay to stamp them out; that many people object to opening 
stores on Sunday and would happily pay something for Sunday closing laws; that some people 
greatly dislike the very idea of transgender people, and would pay something to ensure that they 
use the bathroom available to people of their biological sex. Under a standard view of liberalism, 
the government is not permitted to take account of these “other-regarding” preferences when it 
regulates.  
 
The examples could easily be proliferated. In these circumstances, it seems important to 
identify limiting principles. Indeed, some people might be tempted to suggest that if identifying 
such principles proves difficult, there should be a general prohibition on including moral 
commitments in cost-benefit analysis at all. That conclusion might be defended on the ground 
that while such a prohibition leads to a problem of underinclusiveness (in welfarist terms), it 
reduces unacceptable decisional complexity and avoids a problem of overinclusiveness (in 
welfarist or other terms). 
 
We think that limiting principles can be identified. Let us begin with legal constraints. 
The most obvious come from the Constitution. If, for example, people like the idea of racial 
segregation, or think that sex discrimination is wonderful, their willingness to pay for regulations 
that promote racial segregation or sex discrimination cannot be counted. It is true that a strict 
welfarist, armed with a perfect method for calculating welfare effects, might want to consider all 
such effects, but it is safe to suggest that regulatory welfarism, implemented through cost-benefit 
analysis, may not take account of moral commitments that offend the Constitution.  
 
So too, some moral commitments are inconsistent with statutory requirements. Some 
people might believe that civil rights laws violate what morality requires, because they intrude 
on freedom of association, or insist that minimum wage and maximum hour laws have the same 
defect. Committed libertarians would object to many regulations on this general ground.68 Here 
again, a strict welfarist would be open to the possibility that preferences of this kind must be 
counted in a cost-benefit analysis, at least if they are backed by willingness to pay. But for 
purposes of actual practice, regulators can certainly refuse to take account of moral commitments 
that are inconsistent with existing sources of law.  
 
We have noted that a significant strand in liberal political theory suggests that the 
government may not interfere with people’s freedom of action unless there is “harm to others.”69 
Taken for all that it is worth, our argument is inconsistent with that view, for it suggests that if 
freedom of action offends people’s moral sensibilities, it might be regulable, at least if those who 
are offended are willing to pay for the interference. To be sure, the cases that concern us here are 
in no tension with the liberal position, because harm to others is involved, but our argument 
                                                      
68 For a view in this general direction, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). 
69 See Mill, supra note; Raz, supra note. 
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could easily be taken to cut more broadly. For reasons that have produced an extensive debate in 
economics and political philosophy, a welfarist would indeed have some trouble with the liberal 
position.70 But for those who broadly embrace that position, it would be possible to accept our 
argument while limiting its domain to cases in which harm to others is involved. Indeed, the 
cases that we explore here do involve that harm and hence fit comfortably within liberal 
constraints.  
 
There is an additional point. It is not fanciful to suppose that some people rejoice, and 
others feel dismay, at the very issuance of regulations, perhaps because of their attitudes toward 
regulation as such, perhaps because of the general area in which particular regulations fall. 
Should regulators survey the American people to see whether rejoicing or dismay would 
accompany the issuance of their regulations, and try to elicit the corresponding willingness to 
pay? Here again, a strict welfarist might be tempted to answer “yes.” But that answer seems daft. 
To say the least, it is hard to generate numbers that are reliable in this context. In any case, it 
would be most surprising if the welfare effects, from abstract reactions of this kind, turned out to 
have the same magnitude as the effects from the more concrete commitments that concern us 
here. Moreover, we suspect that at this level of abstraction, valuations in different directions will 
cancel each other out. People who are philosophically opposed to government economic 
regulation in general might be willing to pay a small amount to block any type of regulation, but 
then there are people who welcome government oversight, and they are likely to be willing to 
pay a small amount for further government involvement in economic life. 
 
More broadly, some utilitarians have said that some preferences, such as sadistic or 
malicious preferences, should not be included in the utilitarian (or welfarist) calculus.71 To be 
sure, it is reasonable to wonder whether any such conclusion is ultimately justified on utilitarian 
(or welfarist) grounds, or whether it requires some kind of nonutilitarian (or nonwelfarist) 
explanation. We do not need to answer that question in order to acknowledge that private 
willingness to pay for certain outcomes (involving, say, acute human suffering) ought not to be 
counted, even if those outcomes would please people.72 
 
E. Two Implementation Questions 
 
Subject to the foregoing limitations, what are the practical implications of our general 
conclusion for cost-benefit analysis?  
  
                                                      
70 See Amartya Sen, supra note.  
71 See RICHARD BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1998). 
72 Consider Dworkin’s broader view, suggesting a general ban on the use of what he calls “external preferences”: 
“Suppose many citizens, who themselves do not swim, prefer [that their city build a pool rather than a theater] 
because they approve of sports and admire athletes…. If the altruistic preferences are counted, so as to reinforce the 
personal preferences of swimmers, the result will be a form of double counting; each swimmer will have the benefit 
not only of his own preference, but also of the preference of someone else who takes pleasure in his success.” See 
DWORKIN, supra note, at 282. This view raises many questions. For one thing, it is not clear that there is double-
counting at all; independent preferences seem to be involved. We bracket those difficulties here and note simply that 
the class of preferences with which we are concerned do not raise the potential problem of double-counting and that 
they must be included on welfarist grounds. If, for example, American consumers are concerned with suffering in 
Rwanda, there is no double-counting when those concerns are registered. 
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1. What Congress wants. The first question is simple: If Congress asks agencies to protect 
dolphins because it believes that dolphins have independent moral value, shouldn’t agencies 
obey Congress’ instructions? Of course they should. And if Congress wants agencies to disregard 
cost-benefit analysis in protecting dolphins, then they should do that as well.73 As we shall see, 
sometimes Congress requires agencies to act, and the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis (whether 
it is unfavorable to action or leaves unanswered questions) cannot justify inaction.  
 
At the same time, prevailing executive orders require an accounting of both costs and 
benefits, and ignoring a class of benefits will ensure that the accounting is inaccurate. It is also 
clear that in many cases of importance, Congress does not want agencies to disregard cost-
benefit analysis, and agencies should not do so. The reason is rooted in the nature of regulation. 
As we have noted, the issue is often not whether to regulate, but how strictly to regulate. An 
analysis of costs and benefits is usually relevant to that issue. If, for example, numerous dolphins 
would be protected by an expensive regulation, the argument for that regulation is stronger than 
if it would protect few dolphins. And if people’s willingness to pay to protect dolphins is very 
high, the argument for that regulation receives additional fortification.  
 
2. A daunting task. The second question concerns how agencies should use moral- or 
empathy-related valuations in cost-benefit analysis. Should an agency really try to figure out 
private willingness to pay? We have said that in principle, the answer is yes. But we 
acknowledge that the task can be daunting. It is impossible to rule out the possibility that in some 
cases, reliable quantification is not possible, and the most that the agency can do is to point to the 
existence of a positive amount without specifying it.74 One reason involves the potential 
unreliability of the only available tools. 
 
Suppose, for example, that the question is how much Americans would pay to reduce 
some harm done to fish in the Atlantic Ocean. It is easy to imagine a contingent valuation study 
that would produce some number for the average American – say, $5 annually, which would 
yield an annual benefit figure in excess of $1 billion. The problem is that for countless 
regulations that produce moral benefits, it would likely be easy to produce the same number, 
which might suggest that the average American would be willing to have a “moral budget” of 
say $5000 or more, and that might seem to defy belief. People might be willing to pay a 
nontrivial amount to help solve one problem, but if they were given a full universe of problems, 
the amount that they would be willing to pay to help solve any particular one might get close to 
$0. The problem, in short, is that contingent valuation studies often ask for willingness to pay 
about particular problems in isolation rather than requiring respondents to consider how 
payments to solve one problem would reduce funds available to solve numerous others. As a 
result, the method may produce unreliable answers.75 Perhaps appropriate studies can overcome 
this problem76 – but perhaps not.77  
 
                                                      
73 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n., 531 US 457 (2001). 
74 There is precedent here. In the context of backover crashes, the agency referred to parents’ concerns for their 
children, and deemed them relevant, but did not monetize them. See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
75 Hausman, supra note __ , at 47–49. 
76 Carson, supra note __, at 30–31, 34–35. 
77 Peter Diamond & Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number? 8 J. Econ. 
Persp. 45, 46 (1994). 
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For the kinds of preferences and values that concern us here, it might be tempting to ask 
instead about charitable contributions, which reflect actual behavior. Such contributions give real 
evidence about how much people are willing to pay on behalf of their moral commitments. It is 
noteworthy, and perhaps revealing, that people give very little relative to the universe of moral 
actions that the government may take. In the United States, charitable donations amount to about 
2% of GDP every year.78 That might seem like a large number, but for any particular object of 
charity, it suggests that the relevant value would be low. An implication is that if agencies either 
relied on charitable donations in order to estimate valuations, or instead disregarded them, their 
ultimate choices would usually not be much affected.  
 
Another way to think about this problem is to consider that of a median household 
income of about $56,000,79 the average household donates about $2,974 to charity per year.80 If 
the donation plus taxes reflect the household’s moral view of how much it owes to moral 
projects, then it might well object to further contributions to moral outcomes that take place 
through regulations that increase the cost of consumer goods. It might even reduce donations to 
offset the loss from higher prices.81  
 
We do not want to reach strong conclusions from these numbers and possibilities. It 
remains true that for various reasons, charitable contributions might understate people’s 
willingness to pay. For example, people might not give much to organizations that seek to reduce 
use of GM food, but they might nonetheless be willing to pay something for GM labels. The 
example suggests that willingness to pay, properly assessed, might greatly exceed charitable 
contributions. People might not trust that charitable contributions will actually go to their 
preferred causes; making such contributions requires people to incur transactions costs; and in 
the case of public goods, people might be willing to contribute if and only if they are assured that 
significant numbers of other people are contributing as well.82 
 
Our major goal is to notice rather than to resolve the measurement problem and to insist 
on the basic principle: People experience welfare losses from social outcomes that offend their 
moral commitments, even if those outcomes do not involve their own wealth or health. Private 
willingness to pay is the best way to measure those losses. Eliciting the relevant values can be 
extremely challenging, but agencies have techniques for doing that, at least as general 
approximations. On welfarist grounds, and subject to the limitations we have identified, there is 




                                                      
78 Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, https://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-
resources/charitable-giving-statistics/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
79 As of 2015. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, REAL MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN THE U.S., available at 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N.  
80 See Charitable Giving Statistics, supra note __. 
81 See James Andreoni, Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. of 
Pol. Econ. 1447, 1449 (1989). 
82 Amartya Sen, Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice: Contingent Valuation and the Market Analogy, 45 
JAPANESE ECON. REV. 23 (1995). 
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It should be clear that the range of potential applications is very wide. As noted, the EPA 
has been urged to consider people’s willingness to pay to protect fish,83 and the Department of 
Interior lost in court when it declined to include existence value as part of the measure of natural 
resource damages.84 We explore here an intentionally heterogeneous assortment of problems, 
unified above all by one factor: All of them are intensely practical, in the sense that they involve 
questions that agencies have recently been asked to resolve, or that they will be asked to resolve 
in the near future.  
 
A. Conflict Minerals 
 
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress required the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to issue regulations requiring firms to disclose their use of “conflict minerals,” which are 
minerals mined in Congo and other countries where armed groups fund themselves by managing 
and extorting mining operations.85 The SEC issued regulations, which were challenged in court 
by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). Among other things, NAM argued that 
the regulations were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act because the 
SEC did not conduct an adequate cost-benefit analysis. While the SEC calculated the cost of the 
regulations to industry, it did not estimate the benefits of the regulations, on the ground that it 
was not feasible to do so. The court rejected NAM’s argument that the agency’s analysis was 
legally insufficient.86 
 
The SEC concluded that the disclosure regime would impose a one-time cost of $3-4 
billion on industry and another $207-$609 million per year.87 At the same time, the SEC 
explained that it was “unable to readily quantify” the benefits.88 The principal reason did not 
involve translating the relevant benefits into monetary equivalents; it involved the difficulty of 
knowing what the benefits might be even before monetization was ventured. The SEC thought 
that it was impossible to know whether disclosure would reduce violence in Congo, and if so, by 
how much. The chain of causation was long and complex. Consumers would need to read or 
learn about the disclosures; this information would need to cause them to reduce their purchases 
from firms that use conflict minerals; the reduction in demand would need to be sufficient to 
cause firms to switch to suppliers of non-conflict minerals; the loss in revenues to armed groups 
in Congo would need to cause them to lay down their arms and negotiate peacefully; and so on. 
The SEC concluded that any effort at quantification would be doomed to failure.89 As a matter of 
law, it emphasized that Congress had mandated its action and thus, in effect, determined that the 
benefits were sufficient by enacting the law.90  
 
The court upheld the agency’s decision as nonarbitary.91 In the court’s view, the 
regulation was not required to pass a cost-benefit analysis, because Congress required it 
                                                      
83 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
84 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
85 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p) (2012). 
86 National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369–70 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
87 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed.Reg. 56,274, 56,334 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b). 
88 Id. at 56,350. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 National Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 370. 
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whatever the outcome of such an analysis. In any case, the agency did not act arbitrarily in 
concluding that the moral value of the regulation could not be quantified and put in monetary 
terms. The court added: 
 
Even if one could estimate how many lives are saved or rapes prevented as a direct result 
of the final rule, doing so would be pointless because the costs of the rule—measured in 
dollars—would create an apples-to-bricks comparison.92 
 
 The court was surely on solid ground when it held that the SEC did not act arbitrarily in 
concluding that it could not estimate the benefits for people living in Congo. It is possible, on 
admittedly speculative assumptions, that the benefits were zero—that the disclosure regime 
would have no effect on fighting in Congo, or even a perverse effect by depriving honest mining 
operations of revenue, and thus very poor workers of their wages. It is also possible, also on 
admittedly speculative assumptions, that the benefits were very high. In the abstract, and even 
after careful exploration of the evidence, it would be difficult to be confident about the level of 
benefits.  
 
 But that does not resolve the question that concerns us here. Suppose that many 
Americans believe that American companies have a moral obligation not to use conflict minerals 
in their operations. Or suppose that many Americans believe that they have a moral obligation 
not to use products that contain conflict minerals, and therefore that American companies should 
disclose to them whether their products contain conflict minerals so that Americans can avoid 
using those products if they choose to. How should such moral considerations be valued? 
 
 Consistent with our analysis, the SEC might have made some effort to determine how 
much Americans are willing to pay in relation to these moral concerns. In the context of this 
regulation, which is a disclosure rule, the question is how much Americans benefit from learning 
that corporations use conflict minerals or do not use conflict minerals. The simplest question is: 
How much would Americans be willing to pay to receive that information? Survey information 
could provide a rough answer to this question. The firms themselves may have information as 
well. There are many ways to gain indirect insights. First, do Americans read or seek access to 
disclosures of this kind as a general matter? Second, if Americans learn that a company uses 
conflict minerals, will they stop using its products? 
 
We suspect that firms’ opposition to the regulation is based not so much on the 
compliance costs as the fear that they will lose sales if Americans learn about their use of 
conflict minerals. If so, the SEC could ask the firms for estimates, grounded in market data, on 
the likely effect of the regulation on sales. 
 
 It is possible, of course, that the monetized moral benefit of the regulation is small. 
Consider an American, named Linda, who pays $420 for a cellphone because it was not 
manufactured with conflict minerals rather than $400 for an otherwise identical cellphone that 
was manufactured without conflict minerals. We infer that this person is willing to pay at least 
$20 to avoid using conflict minerals, but it is also the case that the person is made worse off to 
                                                      
92 Id. at 369. 
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the tune of $20 as a result of the price increase.93 Yet in the case given, the benefit is not zero; 
Linda is better off on net. She prefers the more expensive cellphone. Other people, like Linda, 
might believe themselves to be better off if, as a result of the regulation, products with conflict 
materials are used less often. In principle, surveys can be used to estimate the aggregate welfare 
benefits of the regulation. 
 
 What if it turns out that the welfare benefits of regulation are low, $0, or even negative 
(including, of course, the benefits to people in Congo)? Should the SEC refuse to regulate? In 
view of the statutory requirement, it is difficult to argue that Congress gave the SEC the choice 
not to regulate if net benefits are zero or less. Under the stated assumption, the better argument is 
that the SEC must regulate—but that in such circumstances it should issue the weakest regulation 
consistent with Congress’ command. This could mean, for example, that the SEC should include 
a de minimis exception, as NAM argued; that it should limit the regulation to companies that 
manufacture with conflict minerals rather than encompass companies that contract with 
manufacturers that use conflict minerals in production; and so on. If all this is correct, then the 
SEC should have done more to calculate benefits, to the extent feasible, and within the 
requirements of law, should have chosen a level of regulatory strictness commensurate with the 




Many consumers are strongly in favor of mandatory labels for GM foods.94 In the United 
States, the public demand, accompanied by interest-group pressures, has led to a statutory 
requirement to that effect.95 The USDA is required to issue implementing regulations in 2018,96 
and an analysis of costs and benefits will have to accompany their issuance.97  
 
Assessment of the benefits will be challenging among multiple dimensions. Many 
consumers think that GM food is unhealthy,98 and they want labels for that reason, but the 
existing evidence suggests that the health concerns are baseless.99 It would not make much sense 
to count willingness to pay that is based on a mistake of fact. Many consumers think that GM 
food creates environmental risks, and they want labels for that reason.100 The evidence is less 
unequivocal here; the consensus appears to be that the risks are somewhere between zero and 
very small.101 For regulators, the appropriate approach is relatively straightforward. If people 
seek labels because of a mistaken belief that GM food creates a risk to health or the environment, 
their desires should be ignored; the appropriate remedy is information, not regulation. If they are 
                                                      
93 For relevant discussion, see Hunt Allcott & Judd Kessler, The Welfare Effects of Nudges (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 21671, 2015), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w21671. 
94 See Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, 68 Admin. L. Rev. 177, 189 (2016). 
95 National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216 (2016) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1621 et 
seq. (2016)). 
96 Id. 
97 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012). 
98 See Sydney E. Scott et al., Evidence for Absolute Moral Opposition to Genetically Modified Food in the United 
States, 11 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 316 (2016) . 
99 For a summary, see Cass R. Sunstein, On Mandatory Labeling, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
100 See id. 
101 See id. We are bracketing some scientific disputes here. 
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concerned about a low probability of harm, the appropriate inquiry involves their willingness to 
pay. 
 
For our purposes here, the central issue lies elsewhere. Suppose that some consumers 
seek GM labels not because they are fearful of adverse effects on health or the environment, but 
because they believe that genetic modification of food is morally abhorrent. If they are willing to 
pay for labels so that they can act on their moral convictions (by refusing to purchase GM foods), 
then the proper way to incorporate the moral commitment into a cost-benefit analysis is to 
determine the magnitude of this willingness-to-pay. As in the case of conflict minerals, we also 
need to take into account how people act once they are informed. If a label causes a person to 
buy more expensive or otherwise less desirable food in order to avoid eating GM food, the 
consumer welfare loss must be subtracted from the willingness-to-pay for the label in order to 
determine the figure to be used in the cost-benefit analysis.102 
 
The GM controversy raises another distinctive issue. Some people appear to think that the 
very idea of GM food is disgusting,103 and while the evidence is not clear on this point, their 
disgust might have a strong moral component. They might think that it is intrinsically wrong to 
“tamper with nature.” Let us bracket the question whether it is easy to make sense of this idea.104 
Now the label produces both direct welfare gains (the avoidance of disgust) as well as gains from 
the ability to avoid violating a moral commitment. Both of these gains must be taken into 
account. 
 
As before, there is a distinction between a moral conviction, unaccompanied by welfare 
effects, and an impact on subjective well-being. The latter is what matters. To the extent that 
people would suffer without GM labels, and are willing to pay for them to avert that suffering, 
their willingness to pay is the appropriate measure. It is also true that if people would save 
money from labels because they could buy normal food rather than organic food, the cost savings 
can be used to approximate their willingness to pay. Eliciting these figures would be challenging, 
not least because of segregating the prevailing fears about health and environmental risks, but in 
principle, it is the right thing to do. 
 
 
C. Mortality Risks Faced By Children 
 
Some critics of cost-benefit analysis argue that it cannot account for loss of human life. 
They claim that risks to human life caused by human activity—including industry, 
transportation, and agriculture—trigger moral concerns that cannot possibly be monetized.105 
 
Notwithstanding the intuitive appeal of this claim, the government does take into account 
the welfare effects of loss of human life. It does so not by monetizing “life,” but by asking about 
people’s willingness to pay to eliminate statistical mortality risks.106 Within the federal 
                                                      
102 See ALLCOTT & HASSLER, supra note __, at 2. 
103 See Sunstein, supra note. 
104 JAMES P. COLLMAN, NATURALLY DANGEROUS (2001). 
105 See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note __, at 8. 
106 See SUNSTEIN, Valuing Life, supra note __. 
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government, the value of a statistical life is typically around $9 million, which reflects evidence 
that people would be willing to pay about $90 to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000.107 On the basis of 
the discussion thus far, we emphatically agree that an approach of this kind is the right start. If 
the government is eliminating statistical risks, it should ask how much people care about doing 
so, and currently, private willingness to pay is the best way to answer that question.  
 
But if agencies are concerned about the welfare effects of mortality, that figure does not 
capture all of the picture. To give the clearest example – and one with evident relevance to 
regulatory policy – mothers and fathers would pay something to eliminate mortality risks faced 
by their children. Indeed, some evidence suggests that parents would be willing to spend a 
significant amount to eliminate such risks – perhaps an amount well in excess of the $90 that 
most people would spend to eliminate purely personal risks of 1/100,000.108 Shouldn’t that 
amount be included in the analysis? When parents lose a child, they suffer a grievous welfare 
loss. There is no justification for refusing to take account of parents’ willingness to pay to 
eliminate statistical risks that their children face. And yet government regulators typically ignore 
that question. 
 
The standard tools are available to answer it.109 In principle, a figure can be derived from 
market behavior, including how much parents spend to buy safety devices that benefit their 
children.110To be sure, the revealed preference information is very noisy, and if that problem 
seems decisive, contingent valuation questions might be used instead. For example, people might 
be asked, “How much are you willing to pay to avoid having your child be subjected to a 
mortality risk of 1/100,000?”111 This question, whose answer should incorporate anticipated 
grief, is the same as those that are now used in the context of regulatory policy.  
 
 We acknowledge that the relevant evidence here remains in its preliminary state; it may 
be too conjectural for government use. Even so, entirely disregarding the loss to parents is not 
defensible. We also acknowledge that with respect to mortality risks, the logic of our argument 
extends beyond parents. Spouses and siblings, for example, would pay something to eliminate 
their loved ones’ mortality risks, and the same is true of friends and even strangers. With respect 
to practice, the case of children seems to be most pressing, but there is a general gap here in the 
calculation of benefits. The current figure of $9 million should be taken as a lower bound insofar 
as it ignores the willingness to pay of those other than the victim. 
 
D. Prison Rape 
 
The Prison Rape Elimination Act,112 enacted in 2003, is designed to reduce the incidence 
of rape in prison. It requires implementing regulations from the Department of Justice.113 We 
have noted that any such regulations must, via executive order, be accompanied by cost-benefit 
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studies of revealed preferences for child safety). 
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analysis, and indeed the Department produced an extensive one.114 We acknowledge that any 
such analysis will be, to many, extremely uncomfortable in this setting. Drawing on the 
Department’s experience, let us explore how our discussion bears on what it actually did. 
 
Suppose that the cost of a particular rule, designed to reduce the risk of prison rape, is 
$500 million. Suppose too that every year, there are 260,000 prison rapes in the United States. 
How should the Department of Justice analyze the benefits of its rule and of alternatives to it? It 
seems clear that alternatives, more and less stringent, would increase and decrease both costs and 
benefits, suggesting that the analysis would bear on the ultimate content of the chosen rule.  
 
The assessment of benefits is evidently challenging. In principle, the Department should 
try to specify the number of prison rapes that its rule would prevent and also the monetary value 
of a case of prevented rape. If the Department expects to prevent 10,000 rapes, and if each rape 
is valued at $500,000, the benefits would be $5 billion—easily enough to justify the regulation. 
Of course the Department would need to have some basis for those projections. How should 
regulators assess the monetary value of reducing prison rape? On the basis of standard practice 
for statistical mortality risks, they should ask about valuation of statistical rape risks. To say the 
least, that is not the easiest question, and there is little good data on it. And indeed, the prison 
rape question is more particular: How much would prisoners pay to eliminate a 1/x risk of being 
raped in prison? Standard theory suggests that that is the right question, but quite apart from 
nonwelfarist considerations, we might doubt that the answer gives an adequate account of the 
adverse welfare effects of being raped. 
 
Here is what the Department actually did.115 It used two methods to specify the cost of a 
case of avoided rape. First, it relied on a contingent valuation study that asked citizens, in a 
particular region of the United States, how much they would be willing to pay to prevent a case 
of rape. That study elicited a value of about $310,000 per victim, reflecting the willingness to 
pay of “society.” Second, it examined compensation measures from the legal system, finding a 
value of about $480,000, with a $670,000 award for juveniles. With these numbers, it generated 
a range of values for the prevention of prison rape. The Department did not specify the number 
of rapes that it expected to prevent, but it concluded that if its rule prevented just 1,671 of the 
260,000 annual prison rapes, the benefits of the rule would exceed its costs. 
 
The $310,000, $480,000, and $670,000 figures raise many questions and doubts. Does 
the legal system have reliable grounds for monetizing rapes, such that the harm from a rape of a 
juvenile is greater than the harm from a rape of an adult? For our purposes, the most important 
part of the analysis is the attempt to elicit “society’s” willingness to pay to prevent a case of 
prison rape. For the reasons we have offered, a contingent valuation study might well produce 
unreliable numbers, and we have no reason to think that $310,000 accurately reflects the relevant 
value. But however it is assessed, the value to prisoners themselves does not capture the full 
social value of preventing prison rape. The Department of Justice was entirely correct to notice 
that point. 
  
                                                      
114 National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,106 (June 20, 2012) 
(codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115). 
115 Id. at 37,111. 
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E. Access for Disabled People 
 
The Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers, owners of buildings open to the 
public, and others to provide “accommodations” for disabled people. The Department of Justice 
issues regulations under the Act. One such regulation, known as “water closet clearances,” 
requires that buildings provide access to people who use wheelchairs, including in bathrooms, 
where toilet stalls would need to be widened and out-swinging doors would be used.116 The 
agency conducted a cost-benefit analysis that monetized the benefits. The Department of Justice 
calculated that the average user saves 5 and ½ minutes per use. Using the average minimum 
wage of a little less than $10 per hour, and multiplying by the number of beneficiaries and the 
frequency with which they use the restroom, the agency estimated total benefits of $900 
million.117  
 
More interestingly, it noted that a major effect of the regulation would be to protect 
people’s “dignity.” In many cases, wheelchair users would no longer need to undergo the 
embarrassment and potential humiliation of asking for assistance in using toilet stalls. Surely that 
is a benefit, but to say that least, it is not easy to monetize. Rather than doing so, the agency 
performed “breakeven analysis,” asking how much the regulation would need to be worth in 
order to produce net benefits.118  
 
It did so in two different ways, calculating (1) how much people who use wheelchairs 
would need to be willing to pay and (2) how much people generally would need to be willing to 
pay. With respect to (2), the agency concluded that even if the amount was very low (a matter of 
pennies), the benefits would justify the costs.119 The latter is of course the question on which we 
are focusing here, and the Department made considerable progress through the use of breakeven 
analysis, which is far better than no analysis at all. But in principle, the agency would have done 
better to make some effort to estimate the relevant amount. If so, it might have determined that 
the figure was higher (or lower), justifying a more stringent (or less stringent) regulation. 
 
F. Climate Change: Foreigners and Future Generations 
 
 1. Two acute dilemmas. In most cases of environmental regulation, the agency (typically 
the EPA) uses cost-benefit analysis in a relatively straightforward way to determine the welfare 
impact of a proposed regulation. Consider, for example, a regulation to limit the emission of 
particulate matter over urban areas. The costs will be borne by affected industries and ultimately 
                                                      
116 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164 (Sept. 
15, 2010) (codified at 28 CFR pt. 35). 
117 Id. at 56,169. 
118 For a summary, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369. 1387-90 (2014). 
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by consumers and workers as well. The principal benefits usually come from reduced mortality 
risk, as measured by the VSL, but EPA takes into account other effects as well, such as the 
impact of the regulation on morbidity, recreational opportunities, and even environmental 
aesthetics.120 
 
 Starting in the Obama administration, the EPA and other agencies began a systematic 
effort to take into account the problems posed by climate change.121 Scientists have established 
that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases contribute to a long-term atmospheric warming 
trend, which will cause various harms around the world, including coastal flooding. The White 
House convened an inter-agency working group that calculated a social cost of carbon (SCC), 
the amount of harm per unit of carbon emitted into the atmosphere.122 This number has been 
used by agencies that regulate power plant operations, vehicle emissions, and other activities that 
produce greenhouse gases.123 
 
 For many reasons, calculation of the benefits of greenhouse gas reductions poses a 
difficult challenge to regulators; two of those reasons are highly unusual and of special relevance 
to our discussion here. First, greenhouse gas emissions from American sources will cause 
significant harm not only to Americans but also to foreigners. How, if at all, should those harms 
be counted? Most normal types of air pollution affect people living near the source and do not 
have substantial effects outside of the territorial boundaries of the United States.124 Second, 
current greenhouse gas emissions harm people in the distant future, including future generations, 
whereas most other types of pollution cause harm to people alive today while long-term effects 
are minimal. The government’s current social cost of carbon is unambiguously and 
unapologetically welfarist in two respects. First, it treats foreigners the same as it treats 
Americans. Second, and less controversially, it treats future generations the same as it treats 
current generations.  
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 It is true, of course, that if Congress explicitly commands the agency to consider only the 
welfare of Americans or to consider the welfare of foreigners and Americans alike, then the 
agency must heed the command.125 If Congress does not, and if it grants discretion to the agency, 
the agency’s conclusion will depend on its political, strategic, and moral judgments.126 A 
possible view is that agencies should focus only on Americans because any government owes its 
sole responsibility to its own citizens.127 Another possible view, as noted above, is that moral 
claims are universal, and that agencies should treat foreigners and Americans alike unless 
forbidden to by Congress. On pure welfarist grounds, this view has considerable appeal. Yet 
another view is that agencies should consider the welfare of foreigners if and only if doing so 
would ultimately prove helpful to Americans – as it might if, for example, it produced a degree 
of reciprocity through rules, from other nations, that ultimately benefit Americans.128 
 
 2. Willingness to pay – for foreigners. How should agencies address these two 
populations—the foreign population and the future population? In the abstract, the answer to the 
first question depends in the first instance on whether agencies should maximize the well-being 
of Americans only, or everyone around the world. Arguments have been made for a variety of 
approaches.129 We do not take a stand on the largest issues here. Our particular argument, based 
on the analysis thus far, is much narrower: whether or not agencies should focus solely on 
Americans, the cost-benefit analysis should include foreigners in a derivative fashion: to the 
extent that Americans care about foreigners, which can be elicited with willingness-to-pay 
methods. Many Americans have strong personal attachments to foreigners (who can include 
friends and relatives), and many also care at least a little bit about the well-being of foreigners 
who are strangers. Some kind of empirical analysis would be necessary to test whether the 
derivative value is large or small. What we are adding is that it must be taken into account.  
 
 3. Willingness to pay – for future generations. The appropriate treatment of future 
populations raises many challenges, often discussed under the rubric of appropriate discount 
rates.130 The impact of most ordinary regulations will be mainly felt by people who are alive 
today. Thus, the welfare impact is direct, and can be easily and uncontroversially determined by 
applying the usual discount rate (under OMB guidance, 3 percent or 7 percent131) to future 
effects.  
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By contrast, greenhouse gas regulation will mainly affect people who are not alive 
today.132 The effect on future populations is akin to the effect on foreign populations: the case 
for regulation may be based on moral considerations independent of direct welfare impacts on 
current generations of Americans. If agencies should be thoroughgoing welfarists and focus on 
everyone, the cost-benefit analysis should take account of impacts on future generations to the 
same extent as Americans. 
 
 We have considerable sympathy for this view, but we do not take a position on the large 
question of how to distribute resources equitably across generations.133 Our point is narrower: 
whether or not agencies should focus solely on the current generation or should take account of 
future generations as well, the cost-benefit analysis should include future generations in a 
derivative fashion: to the extent that Americans wish to protect future generations, their desire 
should be counted, and it can be elicited with willingness-to-pay methods. Many Americans do 
care, at least a little, about the well-being of people in the distant future. Here as elsewhere, an 
empirical analysis is needed to determine their willingness-to-pay for the well-being of future 




 We have argued that when agencies conduct cost-benefit analysis of regulations, they 
should use valuations that reflect how much people are willing to pay to see their moral beliefs 
vindicated or to reduce the level of psychological harm they feel if those beliefs are not 
vindicated. Now we ask how this principle interacts with law. 
 
A. Executive Enforcement 
 
Executive Order 13,563134 requires agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis of major 
regulations. Section 1(c) also provides: 
 
Where appropriate and permitted by law, each agency may consider (and discuss 
qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human 
dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.135 
 
Under Executive Order 13,563, willingness to pay to protect moral values can be taken into 
account through two different routes. The first is cost-benefit analysis itself. For reasons we have 
given, that willingness to pay should be considered under the standard framework. The second 
involves section 1(c), which authorizes agencies consider a range of moral values. To be sure, 
section 1(c) emphasizes the difficulty of quantifying such values, but our suggestion here is that 
that difficulty can be overcome. 
  
                                                      
132 We do not mean to deny that climate change is having current effects; the point is that regulation of current 
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133 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Nicolas Treich, Prioritarianism and Climate Change, 62 ENV’L & RESOURCE 
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134 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012). 
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It is possible to go further. If our argument is correct, the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs should either encourage or require agencies to consider and (to the extent 
feasible_ to monetize the moral effects of regulation and to use the valuations in cost-benefit 
analyses of regulations. Most formally, this could be accomplished through a revision of the 
guidance document that implements the cost-benefit mandate,136 or more likely through informal 
give-and-take. 
 
B. Judicial Enforcement 
 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts are required to invalidate regulations that 
are “arbitrary and capricious.”137 Courts must also strike down a regulation when it is 
inconsistent with the organic statute under which the agency issued the regulation. In some cases, 
courts have struck down regulations for failing a cost-benefit analysis, based on one or both 
sources of law.138 As we have noted, the Supreme Court has also indicated that even when the 
organic statute provides only broad guidance to the regulator (for example, requiring the agency 
to regulate when “appropriate or necessary”), the agency must consider costs, and that it may not 
regulate if the costs “significantly” exceed the benefits.139  
 
While the law is not yet settled, these cases appear to impose an obligation on agencies to 
conduct some kind of cost-benefit analysis of regulations except when a statute forbids them 
to.140 On one view, the requirement of nonarbitrariness means that agencies must monetize costs 
and benefits, and refrain from issuing a regulation if the costs exceed the benefits, unless they 
can provide a good reason for believing that the costs and benefits cannot be monetized fully or 
at all.141 If it is appropriately deferential, judicial review can prevent agencies from manipulating 
cost-benefit analyses to achieve political ends and ensure that agencies avoid common errors, 
particularly in the form of disregarding or underplaying important benefits or costs. 
 
 It is possible to believe that the “moral effects” of a regulation are just the type that 
cannot be monetized. As we have noted, some agencies appear to hold this view, as in the case of 
an important regulation from the Department of Transportation, designed among other things to 
protect children from the risk of backover crashes.142 In that case, however, the agency at least 
recognized parents’ values and took them into account.143 However, if we are correct that the 
moral effects of a regulation can and should be monetized, then the failure to monetize them 
could be sufficient grounds for a court to strike down a regulation. 
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 Support for this view can be found in Ohio v. Department of the Interior.144 Recall that in 
that case, a panel of the D.C. Circuit struck down a regulation that calculated compensation for 
victims of spills and leaks of hazardous substances that damaged natural resources. The DOI had 
limited compensation to “use value,” that is, market damages, and excluded “existence value” 
except when use value could not be determined. Existence value refers to the value that people 
attach to protection of resources that they do not expect to use.145 By excluding existence value 
from the calculation of damages when a use value could also be determined, the DOI regulation 
would have undercompensated people on account of moral harms. While the court’s ruling was 
based in part on its interpretation of the underlying statute,146 its conclusion that people may be 
injured by the destruction of existence value—a subcategory of what we have called moral 
effects—is broadly applicable. 
   
Conclusion 
 
 In many respects, the regulatory state has become a cost-benefit state, in the sense that 
agencies must catalogue costs and benefits before proceeding, and in general, must show that the 
benefits justify the costs. After years of experience, agencies have well-established tools for 
valuing risks to health, safety, and the environment. Sometimes, however, regulations are 
designed to protect third parties or otherwise to promote moral values, and agencies have 
struggled to quantify their benefits; often they ignore them. 
  
 Our principal submission here has been that people often care about such values, and they 
suffer some kind of welfare loss when they are compromised. If so, the best way to measure that 
loss is through eliciting private willingness to pay. Of course, it is true that the principal reason 
to protect moral values is to do exactly that, and not to prevent the welfare loss to those who care 
about them. But that loss unquestionably matters, and in some cases, it might turn out to be very 
large. There is no justification for agencies to ignore it. 
 
                                                      
144 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
145 Frank Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 285-86 (1989) (“[H]umans may 
obtain ‘vicarious value’ from natural resources. Even if I never intend to visit Yosemite National Park, I may still 
value its preservation. The knowledge that a given natural environment is protected is valuable to some Americans, 
and vicarious appreciation of nature, therefore, has a demonstrable economic value.”). This article was relied on by 
the court in Ohio, 880 F.2d at 464. 
146 Id. at 463-64. 
